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RECENT FEDERAL CASES
Pre-emption of State Anti-sedition Legislation by Federal Legislation . In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, U.S., 100 L.Ed. Adv. R. 415, Sup.Ct.
477 (1956), the United States Supreme Court, per Mr. Chief Justice Warren, sustained
the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Western- District, quashing the
indictment of Steve Nelson under the Pennsylvania Sedition Act. (Under that indictment, he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, to a
$10,000 fine and to costs of prosecution in the sum of $13,000 by the lower Pennsylvania
court.) Subsequent to the state court trial, Nelson, an open and avowed communist,
was tried and convicted under the federal anti-sedition act (the so-called Smith Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2385, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385), receiving a five-year prison term. Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954).
The United States Supreme Court based its decision, as did the Pennsylvania court,
on the supersession of the state sedition statute by the federal act. The Court's holding
confined itself to that narrow point; by reaching this result, the Court made it unnecessary to consider the due process questions raised by the alleged errors in the conduct
of the trial. Likewise, the Court did not have to pass on the constitutionality of certain
portions of the state act, possibly vulnerable to attack for vagueness and lack of a
proper standard.
The Court spelled out in detail what it did not purport to hold by the decision. The
holding does not affect the right of the states to enforce their sedition laws when the
federal government has not "occupied the field." Where state and federal governments
have been specifically granted concurrent jurisdiction, a state is not ousted from its
jurisdiction. (The eighteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States is
an example of the express reservation of concurrent power to the state.) Nor is the
state proscribed from protecting itself against sabotage or attempted violence. Where
the same conduct constitutes both a federal offense and a state offense against a distinct
interest of each, the state is empowered to prosecute the crime against the state. (Fox
v. State of Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847), illustrates this situation: counterfeiting constituted a crime against the federal government while the passing of false
bills was a crime against the state government; both sovereigns had an interest which
they could legitimately protect by appropriate legislation and action thereunder. In
Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256 (1927), violation of federal banking rules was
held a crime against the federal government and embezzlement, a crime against the
state.) The majority of the Court in the Nelson opinion treated Gilbert v. Minnesota,
254 U.S. 325 (1920) as a case involving distinct state and federal interests, prevention
of breach of the peace being the state interest and prevention of interference with
enlistment in the armed forces of the United States, the federal interest. However,
on its face, the Minnesota statute sought to punish the identical crime which the federal
statute proscribed: interference with, or discouragement from enlisting in the armed
forces of the United States. The Minnesota statute dealing specifically with breach of
the peace would seem to have been adequate to protect the state interest, were that its
only legitimate interest. Actually the Court, in the Gilbert case, itself, grounded its
decision on the theory that the conduct constituted a threat to the safety of both state
and federal governments, against which threat each sovereign could proect itself. By
this approach, sedition, too, would be a crime threatening the safety of both state and
federal government.
Were the seditious utterances directed not only toward the federal government, but
toward the state government as well, or only toward the state government, it would seem

1956]

RECENT FEDERAL CASES

that the state should not be precluded by the holding of this case from prosecuting on
its own behalf. However, the Court did state in referring to the federal sedition statutes
(the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385; Registration of Propagandists Act, 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 611 et. seq.; Internal Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C.A. § 781 et seq.; Communist
Control Act of 1954, 50 U.S.C.A. § 841, 843; Conspiracy, 18 U.S.C.A. § 371; Activities
affecting the armed forces generally, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2387; Jurisdiction and Venue of
the Federal Courts, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3231), "Looking to all of them in the aggregate,
the conclusion is inescapable that Congress has intended to occupy the field of sedition
...no room has been left for the States to supplement the federal law.... It has
charged the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency with
responsibility for intelligence concerning Communist seditious activities against our
Government, and has denominated such activities as part of a world conspiracy. It
accordingly proscribed sedition against all government in the nation-national, state,
and local." U.S.-,-,
76 Sup.Ct. 477, 481 (1956). Only sedition against
the federal government was charged in this case; thus, the implication of the preemption of state statutes relating to sedition against the government of the state contained in this statement is necessarily dictum. The Court's specific disavowal of preemption where the conduct constitutes a threat to an interest peculiarly or predominantly important to the state, as discussed above, would seem to negate any implication
that the states' rights to protect themselves against sedition directed toward the state
government had been superseded by the federal legislation. Although article IV,
section 4, of the Constitution of the United States affirmatively imposes the burden
on the federal government to preserve and protect the republican government of the
several states, it has never been thought that the states were in any way denied the
right to protect themselves. At the present time forty-two states (including Washington, RCW 9.81) and Alaska and Hawaii have anti-sedition legislation on their
books.
What is the basis for the Court's finding of pre-emption? The Court applied the
same criteria utilized in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), a
commerce clause case, likewise finding pre-emption by federal legislation: (1) a pervasive and complete federal regulatory scheme raising the inference that congressional
regulation is to be exclusive and (2) a federal interest so dominant that it does not
admit of state regulation.
As to the first criterion, the Court found, by examining the federal legislation dealing
with or relating to sedition, that it evinced a scheme of comprehensive legislation
completely occupying the field. Even though no such intent was explicit in the statutes
themselves, the Court, in viewing them in the aggregate, considered their breadth
vasive and complete federal regulatory scheme raising the inference that Congressional
of coverage sufficient evidence of that intent. In support of the proposition that Congressional intent can be inferred from evidence of a pervasive scheme of legislation, the
Court cited three cases. Two of the cases cited were commerce clause cases: the Rice
case, cited above, and Charleston & Western CarolinaR. Co. v. Varnville FurnitureCo.,
237 U.S. 597 (1915). Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the minority in the principal case
noted in reference to the Rice case that the federal statute in question explicitly
conferred exclusive jurisdiction with respect to persons securing a license under the
federal act. Justice Reed also forcibly pointed out that the "occupation-of-the-field"
argument has been developed by the Court in the setting of the commerce clause and
of the legislation enacted thereunder in order to prevent the development of trade
barriers inspired by predominantly provincial interests. Basically the commerce clause
cases cope with a very different problem: the determination of whether state regulation of intrastate commerce or state regulation pursuant to the exercise of state power
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impinges upon interstate regulation, the sole province of Congress, or unduly burdens
the over-all national interest in the free flow of commerce. Contrast this with the
problem posed by the present case: the determination of whether the federal government, alone, or concurrently with the states shall be charged with the protection of
government (both state and federal) from acts of sedition. The question is not one of
balancing conflicting interests or of striking down state regulation of exclusively
federal subject matter, but rather the question is one of selecting the means of
protection most effective for the nation as a whole.
The third case cited, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), denied the State of
Pennsylvania the right to require the registration of aliens and the carrying of identification papers by such aliens, because such legislation was considered to be within the
peculiar province of the federal government. That case is clearly distinguishable from
the present one. The alien registration involved in the Hines case is fraught with
international overtones. Under our federal system, the Constitution makes immigration, foreign relations, and the granting of United States citizenship exclusively the
responsibility of the federal government; any such impingement by state action, even
though enacted as a protective measure by the state cannot be tolerated in an area
exclusively delegated to the federal government.
Nothing in the Smith Act itself or in the legislative history of the bill would seem
to indicate any intent to pre-empt the area. See, for example, the Congressional
discussions at the time of the 1948 amendments: S. REP. No. 1358, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess., 9; H.R.REP. No. 1950, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2, 25-46; in these materials, notice
was taken that forty-two states and the Territories of Hawaii and Alaska have such
statutes, and although considerable discussion centered around the necessity for national
legislation, no mention was made of its displacing any of the existing state legislation.
The statute, itself, was largely patterned after the New York statute.
Representative Howard Smith of Virginia, author of the Smith Act, vigorously
denies any intent on his part or that of Congress to pre-empt state sedition legislation
by passage of federal legislation making sedition a federal crime. In answer to the
decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the Nelson case, he has introduced
H.R. 3 (84th Cong.), a bill seeking to limit the finding of pre-emption by the Court
to those cases in which Congress specified such intent or those cases in which an
irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state laws exists. When he introduced
the bill, Representative Smith stated that it was "the decision of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania [in the principal case] that caused me to introduce this bill.... Obviously
that case was merely a symptom of a dangerous disease that threatened to destroy
completely the sovereignty of the States.... I decided to offer a separate bill to scek
a cure of the whole malady" (rather than an amendment to the Smith Act, alone). 101
Cong. Rec. No. 3, p. A 39 (1955).
In applying the second criterion, the Court found the federal interest to be so
dominant that the federal system of enforcement must be deemed exclusive. The Court
supported this finding mainly by restating the point that Congress has devised an "allembracing program for resistance to the various forms of totalitarian aggression,"
including huge appropriations for both external and internal defenses. The Court
implied that internal defense is so inextricably interwoven with external defense that
all must be made the exclusive concern of the federal government.
The Court made the further point that the state sedition acts pose dangers of conflict
with federal administration. To support this, the Court quoted statements made by
J. Edgar Hoover and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt stressing the necessity for
nation-wide comprehensive investigation and action against subversive activities. To
the extent that local activity might precipitate premature action, this point is well
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taken, for the local enforcement agencies cannot be fully apprised of how a local
manifestation of seditious conduct fits into the national picture. However, this objection
to state action is even more validly applicable to such activities as spying and actual
sabotage. Yet the Court in the principal case explicitly says that its decision does not
limit the right of the state to protect itself against sabotage.
The Court mentioned in this connection its pre-emption holdings in cases in the
labor-management field. (See, for example, Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and
Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), and Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
348 U.S. 468 (1955).) The Court has held the National Labor Relations Board to be
the exclusive agency for handling questions coming within the purview of the TaftHartley Act. However, that administrative agency was created as an integral part of
the national labor legislation to administer its provisions and to effectuate its policies.
In the absence of such an agency there seems much less reason for the Court to find
a legislative intent for exclusive federal administration.
It would seem that other more persuasive bases for the Court's decision could have
been advanced. Although, because of its holding, the Court did not have to reach the
constitutional question presented by multiple punishment, the Court noted that it was
not unmindful of the risk of compounding punishment where both state and federal
prosecution are allowed. Where penalties are severe, the problem is particularly
poignant. Since the punishment set by each sovereign is theoretically commensurate
with the crime, it would seem that to allow each sovereign to impose full punishment
for the same act might well be open to the same type of due process objection which
Air. Justice Frankfurter made in Rochin v. California,342 U.S. 65 (1952) : procedure
which is offensive to "a sense of justice." United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922),
cited as authority for allowing double punishment, it should be noted, was decided under
a state statute specifically authorized by the eighteenth amendment. Another commonlycited case, California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949), did not involve severe penalties,
but rather fines under regulatory statutes.
Due process objections, both substantive and procedural, were raised, as to the
Pennsylvania statute and the proceedings thereunder. The statute, typical of many
state statutes, punishes utterances or conduct intended to "incite or encourage any
person to commit any overt act with a view to bringing the government of this state
or of the United States into hatred or contempt." Pennsylvania Penal Code § 207, 18,
P.S. § 4207, (c). Also, Pennsylvania law allows an information to be brought by a
private individual. The Pennsylvania statute thus seems vulnerable to charges of lack
of a sufficient standard and lack of minimal safeguards to assure impartial proceedings.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania detailed several objections to the conduct of the
trial, itself, including, among others, refusal to allow defendant sufficient time to
obtain counsel, improper and inflammatory remarks by the district attorney, and
refusal of the judge to disqualify himself although he was an active member of
"Americans Battling Communism." 377 Pa. 58, 104 A2d 133 (1954).
Although the due-process grounds suggested above would possibly justify the
result of the principal case, it would seem that the dissent of Mr. Justice Reed,
representing also the views of Justices Minton and Burton, presented the betterreasoned argument. In any event, there is a practical lesson in this case for Congress:
its intention to pre-empt or not to pre-empt should be spelled out in the statute.
Viewed in another way, this decision may well represent a recognition of the
superiority of national facilities for crime detection. Without doubt, local law enforcement is inadequate to deal with those crimes which are only local manifestations of a
regional or national operation. This case could be a point of departure for a new line
of cases finding federal pre-emption in those areas of federal activity where the Court
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decides Congress must have intended pre-emption from the Court's finding that in
the particular case the federal government can act more effectively single-handed.
BETTY B. FLETCHER

Habeas Corpus-Jurisdiction of a Federal District Court with Respect to State
Prisoners. Giron et al. v. Cranor, 116 F.Supp. 92 (E.D.Wash. 1953), aff'd sub norn.
Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 935 (1956)
represents another significant step in the expanding supervision of state criminal proceedings by the federal courts. Petitioner was arrested without a warrant and held
incommunicado for more than 24 hours by Seattle police. During this interval he was
intensely interrogated and finally signed a statement which was offered as a confession
at the murder trial of petitioner and his two alleged accomplices. Timely objection was
made to the admission on the ground the statement was coerced, and, pursuant to
established Washington practice, the trial court received evidence as to the circumstances under which the statement was made. The issue of voluntariness was decided
by the trial court adversely to petitioner, the confession was admitted in evidence, and
was submitted to the jury with instructions that the jurors were to consider the conflicting testimony regarding the circumstances of signing and were to determine whether
the statement was made under the influence of fear produced by threats. In cases where
the trial court has admitted a confession over objection, RCW 10.58.030 makes it a
question of fact for the jury to decide whether or not the confession should be rejected
as induced.
Apart from Gonzales' confession, there was substantial evidence that the murder
was part of a conspiracy in which each of the three defendants took part. Both the
federal district court which granted habeas corpus and the circuit court which upheld
issuance of the writ tacitly assumed that a verdict based on other evidence alone would
have been sustained. The defect inherent in the Washington procedure in this type of a
case is the fact that a general verdict fails to disclose what, if any, use the jury has
made of the confession. There are at least four distinct possibilities: 1) the jury may
expressly have found the confession voluntary and used it as a basis for conviction;
2) the jury may have found the confession to be involuntary, and, in accord with the
instructions, completely disregarded it and reached its verdict solely on the basis of the
other evidence; 3) the jury may not have clearly decided the issue of voluntariness,
simply returning an unanalytical and impressionistic verdict based on all the jurors
saw and heard; (4) the jury may have decided not even to consider the question of
the voluntariness of the confession, reaching a verdict on the basis of other evidence.
As a practical matter, the problem is further complicated by the fact that no two
jurors use the same mental processes in arriving at a verdict.
Following the verdict, Gonzales and his fellow defendants gave notice of appeal, but
the appeal was never perfected and was subsequently dismissed by the Washington
Supreme Court without consideration of the merits. Petition was later made to the
Washington Supreme Court for writ of habeas corpus, and upon denial of the application without opinion, writ of certiorari was brought to the United States Supreme
Court. Certiorari was denied without opinion, and the three prisoners petitioned the
federal district court in Spokane for writs of habeas corpus. This petition alleged
the confession was coerced by force and threats of further force, that it had been
admitted in evidence over timely objection, and that it had been used by the jury to
reach the general verdict of guilty. The federal court held an independent hearing on
the issues raised by these allegations, passed upon the credibility of the various witnesses
who had been subpoenaed-including several members of the Seattle police, resolved
conflicts in the testimony of these witnesses, and made its own findings regarding the
voluntariness of the confession. In granting the writ to Gonzales, Judge Driver held

